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In recent years, the EU has attempted to strike a 
delicate balance in its response to China’s rise and the 
accompanying historic shift in the global balance of 
power. It has sought to construct a multifaceted strategy 
that encompasses the two continents’ interdependencies, 
the undeniable ideological clash, and a principled 
response to human rights violations. In 2019, the 
European Commission labelled China a negotiating 
partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.1
The present moment may mark a turning point: in a little 
over three months, an agreement (in principle) on an 
investment treaty was followed by sanctions and counter-
sanctions. All the while, geopolitical conflict ratchets 
up between China and the US. Beijing is also embarking 
on a new economic course that will reshape its global 
relationships. The locomotive of the past two decades’ 
global growth is attempting to slow and rebalance its 
model,  with serious implications for the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, it has mapped out a grand economic and 
industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions 
that underpin the EU’s approach.
This Policy Brief addresses the latter development: 
stepping back, how has China’s grand industrial strategy 
evolved over the past decade? What new course is being 
mapped out in its 14th Five-Year Plan (5YP)? Drawing 
on a range of expert insight, it analyses the broad, 
geopolitical implications for the EU’s economic relations 
with China. Even as the EU faces growing competition in 
technologically sophisticated sectors, Beijing’s inward 
turn risks cutting off its access to the Chinese market 
and compensating for greater competition. The Chinese 
economic model is evolving to blur the line between the 
public and private further, potentially rendering current 
efforts to tackle unfair Chinese competition insufficient. 
Finally, China’s efforts to attract foreign technology mean 
it is courting foreign investment actively, even while it 
signals greater protectionism to products made elsewhere. 
This calls into question the traditional equating of 
investor protection with European economic interests.
BACKGROUND
EU–China economic relations
In 2020, China became the EU’s largest trading partner for 
goods, finally surpassing the US.2 This appears driven by 
COVID-19 disruptions, but even if it reverses, China’s size 
means it is the likely long-term equilibrium. However, 
this pales in comparison to intra-EU trade, and the US 
is still our biggest trading partner when accounting for 
services. In 2019, China accounted for an average of 2.4% 
of EU member states’ exports, compared to 67.0% of the 
EU Single Market and 5.7% of the US. Germany stands 
out for its relatively high dependence on Chinese trade, 
taking up 48.5% of total EU exports to China, or 7.2% of 
its own exports. Meanwhile, only around 5.0% of the EU’s 
inbound investment is Chinese.3
Certain European sectors and companies are significantly 
reliant on the Chinese market, such as Volkswagen 
(21% of revenues) or semiconductor firms NXP (37%) 
and Infineon (27%). In a sample of 25 public European 
companies, an average of 11% of revenue came from 
China. However, the Chinese operations of European 
multinationals tend to be remarkably self-contained.4 
Volkswagen produces 95% of vehicles for the Chinese 
market locally and reinvested 90% of the profits 
generated back into China.5
In terms of specific dependencies, the EU’s exposure 
to China appears contained to the less technologically 
sophisticated portions of the value chain. China is 
particularly dependent on EU machinery and machine 
tools. However, it has steadily climbed up the value chain 
and is increasingly challenging European companies in 
sophisticated sectors. Furthermore, the EU has become 
increasingly integrated into the Chinese value chain, 
even as the intra-EU value chain becomes less integrated. 
China’s reliance on EU intermediate goods is also 
decreasing, while EU reliance on Chinese intermediate 
goods has continued to rise.6
Overall, Chinese trade has brought the EU a range of 
benefits, from a growing export market to access to 
cheaper inputs. However, this has been coupled with 
longstanding concern over forced technology transfers, 
the role of state subsidies, and SOEs distorting trade 
and fair competition. In certain sectors (e.g. steel, solar 
panels), European companies have borne the brunt of 
subsidised Chinese manufacturing.
Chinese economic and industrial policy 
From 1978 to the early 2000s, Chinese economic policy 
was relatively sector-agnostic. However, since 2006 and 
accelerating in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, 
China began to develop an industrial policy that focuses 
on specific sectors, particularly emerging technologies. 
This ‘techno-industrial policy’ is driven by Chinese 
policymakers’ theory that they must take advantage  
of a coming wave of general-purpose technologies  
that will transform the world’s economic and 
geopolitical structure:
“A new round of global technological revolution, 
sectoral change and military change is accelerating, 
and scientific exploration is unfolding at every scale 
from the microscopic to the cosmological. A group of 
revolutionary new technologies that are intelligent, 
green and ubiquitous are reshaping the global 
competitive landscape and changing the relative 
strength of nations.”7
To position itself at the forefront of the coming 
technological revolution, China enacted a range of 
overlapping strategies (e.g. the Strategic Emerging 
Industries programme, the infamous Made in China 
2025). In 2016, these plans were weaved together in 
an “integrating vision, a kind of master plan”8 – the 
Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (IDDS). It is 
accompanied by a range of incentives and new policy 
mechanisms, the most important of which are arguably 
‘industrial guidance funds’. Since 2014, these public 
investment funds have deployed between 6% to 11% 
GDP into new technologies. In the words of Chinese 
economy expert Barry Naughton, “Even if we confine our 
attention to the Industrial Guidance Funds, it is almost 
certain that the IDDS represents the greatest single 
commitment of government resources to an industrial 
policy objective in history.”9
Chinese private companies are significant beneficiaries 
of these funds. China’s new techno-industrial policy 
self-consciously seeks to meld market mechanisms 
with government guidance and investment. The 
guidance funds attempt to replicate US-style capital 
market activity across a range of funding types and 
instruments. Research indicates that state-owned 
investment firms have become a dominant force in 
Chinese capital markets.10 In keeping with this melding 
of public guidance and private enterprise, there has been 
significant growth of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
committees in private companies.
 
China’s new techno-industrial policy 
self-consciously seeks to meld market 
mechanisms with government guidance 
and investment. 
 
Analysts distinguish this new approach to economic 
governance from the SOE-dominated ‘China, Inc.’ 
model. The latter – a source of much consternation 
in trade policy circles – relied on SOEs’ nebulous and 
privileged status and use of state banks to channel 
hidden subsidies. While SOEs have gained greater 
prominence and scale under President Xi, the new ‘CCP, 
Inc.’ or ‘investor state’ is a much more fluid ecosystem 
of regulation, political control, state capital flows and 
strategic direction-setting, with no clear demarcation 
between the public and private sector.11
The success of this new approach remains to be seen. 
China is still struggling in several of its target areas 
(e.g. semiconductor manufacturing), and tales of waste, 
fraud and contradictory policy incentives are rife. 
On the other hand, there have been several notable 
successes, such as in renewable energy, electric vehicles 
and semiconductor design.12 Aggregate data bears 
that China’s innovation capacity has been increasing 
steadily,13 and so is its rise up the value chain.
STATE OF PLAY
The Five-Year Plan
In many ways, the latest 5YP represents a continuation 
of the techno-industrial policy turn. However, it also 
marks a shift to a more insular and security-focused 
strategy, with technological self-sufficiency and 
increased reliance on the domestic market at its heart. 
Analysts note a greater concern over the international 
environment, a melding of national security and 
economic policies, and Chinese policymakers’ 
reassessment of their supply chain exposure and 
the benefits of interdependence.14 In many ways, 
this mirrors European and American debates over 
decoupling and strategic autonomy.
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As President Xi declared a year ago,
“The shock of the pandemic has revealed the hidden 
risks in our production and supply chains. In order to 
ensure our industrial security and national security, 
we must strive to build self-reliant, controllable, 
secure, and dependable production and supply  
chains […] and comprehensively increase efforts to 
innovate and substitute (technology) imports.”15
As a result, China’s new economic strategy explicitly 
seeks to develop domestic supply chains. Critically, 
this includes encouraging foreign companies to set up 
local operations and become “magnet[s] for attracting 
global resources and factors.”16 European firms in 
China are already feeling the impacts. Some are being 
actively courted by Chinese policymakers due to their 
ability to bring in new technology. Others are forced to 
turn to Chinese supply chains and firewall their China 
operations, particularly in sensitive areas like digital and 
telecommunications technology. Still others are being 
squeezed out of areas where China already has significant 
indigenous capabilities in favour of national firms.17
China’s new economic strategy explicitly 
seeks to develop domestic supply chains. 
Critically, this includes encouraging foreign 




A key concept in this new strategy is dual circulation, 
which distinguishes domestic (i.e. domestic market, 
domestic demand, domestic supply chains) and 
international circulations (i.e. international trade, 
external demand). Although their precise definitions are 
contested, the focus appears to be on improving domestic 
economic capacity and leveraging domestic demand to 
do so, in keeping with the self-sufficiency goals outlined 
above, while still being able to tap into external demand.
However, despite China’s longstanding demand 
imbalances – an extremely low share of consumption 
as a share of GDP, an equally high investment rate –, 
domestic circulation appears focused on supply-side 
reforms for now. This has implications for Europe since 
measures to rebalance domestic demand and increase 
Chinese households’ purchasing power would have likely 
meant increased wages, rebalancing the cost advantages 
of Chinese industry and producing a more level playing 
field. The focus on the supply side could signal moves to 
reorientate existing domestic demand towards domestic 
products, to the disadvantage of European exporters. 
The growth of regional trade initiatives (e.g. the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership) – the external 
circulation – can also be understood in this context: 
“Such [trade talks] will help break the US conspiracy 
of excluding China and will lure foreign technology, 
industries, capital and talent to China”.18
PROSPECTS
China’s new approach has three significant implications 
for the EU’s economic relations with China.
1.  Tougher competition, greater protectionism
The past decade has already given the world a taste of 
China’s growing competitiveness in technologically 
sophisticated sectors. While its model’s resource 
waste may be substantial, the huge investment in 
the sectors – combined with competition, market 
mechanisms and the benefits of a huge internal market 
– will undoubtedly yield new challenges for European 
companies in advanced sectors, particularly in third-
country markets. In and of itself, greater competition 
and technological development should be welcomed. 
But if China’s protectionist tendencies bear fruit, 
particularly if combined with continued repression of 
Chinese consumption, Europe would lose out on the 
benefits of a growing Chinese market. Rather than offer 
the potential for greater economies of scale and profit in 
exchange for tougher competition, Europe could become 
exposed to deeply distorted, mercantilist competition and 
increasingly one-sided supply chain dependency.
2.  Further blurring of the public/private  
sector distinction
European policymakers have focused much of their 
concerns over fair competition on SOEs and subsidies. 
These remain active concerns. However, a system of 
strategic state direction, widespread public investment in 
private firms, and extensive public-private cooperation 
create a very different set of level-playing field challenges 
that will need to be addressed.
3.  Divergence of European investors’  
and exporters’ interests
China has long sought to draw in foreign investors to help 
it develop domestic capacities, and indications are that 
it will continue to do so. However, if it is also consciously 
reducing imports and external supply chain dependencies, 
EU policy must draw a clear distinction between the 
interests of the European economy and of China-based 
multinationals that are headquartered in Europe. 
The benefits of European investment abroad come from 
the spillovers back to Europe itself, such as bigger export 
markets, scale economies, technological innovation, 
and the development of more efficient supply chains. 
However, if these investments result in European 
multinationals setting up increasingly self-contained 
Chinese operations that cement China’s dominance 
in various value chains further, this may benefit their 
balance sheets but provide little benefits to the European 
real economy and European workers. It then becomes 
more debatable whether agreements like the EU–China 
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Comprehensive Agreement on Investment truly advance 
Europe’s economic interests (even laying aside the debate 
over its enforceability, scope and political desirability in 
the face of recent Chinese sanctions).
How should the EU adapt its China strategy?
Should China continue down this path, in response, the 
EU should:
•  continue to develop trade instruments to combat 
unfair competition at home and abroad, including 
through cooperation with allies and the reform of 
multilateral institutions;
•  ensure that these instruments and institutions can 
respond to unfair competition from private companies 
benefiting from state capital investment, not just  
from SOEs;
•  ensure that the extensive and often opaque 
government holdings in private firms are reflected  
in foreign direct investment and export controls;
•  incorporate China’s attempts to reconfigure 
supply chains into its own assessment of strategic 
dependencies, identifying areas that could  
become vulnerable;
•  prioritise improving access to the Chinese market for 
goods and services produced in Europe (when it comes 
to European companies’ investment in China, the 
European Commission must carefully analyse whether 
spillover benefits truly justify expending precious 
political and diplomatic capital);
•  develop alternative sources of growth (e.g. growing 
markets in Asia, Africa), and boost demand and reduce 
barriers within the Single Market to offset greater 
Chinese protectionism; and
•  ensure that its industrial policy efforts will enable 
European industry to match China’s developments. 
A mapping exercise should be conducted to evaluate 
the EU’s level of committed resources relative to 
China (and the US), covering both member state and 
EU-level support and controlling Chinese policy’s 
inherent waste.
 
China is actively developing a greater 
synthesis of economic, national security 
and geopolitical strategy, and the EU must 
adapt its own strategy to reflect that. 
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economic, national security and geopolitical strategy,  
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A protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies 
will threaten Europe’s long-term strategic autonomy and 
undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach 
to EU–China relations. If the EU’s multi-track strategy 
is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve 
economic parity and balance between the two powers.
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